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THE WORLD OF LAW CLERKS: TASKS, 
UTILIZATION, RELIANCE, AND 
INFLUENCE 
STEPHEN L. WASBY* 
This Article is an examination of the work of judges’ law clerks, based 
on a variety of materials.  It begins with consideration of who is a law 
clerk and of the role of staff attorneys and judges’ secretaries.  Clerks’ 
tasks are examined next, with attention to the preparation of bench 
memoranda and judges’ delegation of work to their clerks.  Aspects of 
clerks’ influence and the related matter of judges’ reliance on them is then 
presented, including attention to law clerks’ recommendations to their 
judges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article about the work of law clerks covers several topics: the 
tasks law clerks perform and judges’ delegation to them and reliance on 
them, as well as reasons that law clerks chose their clerkships.  The 
observations about these topics are drawn primarily although not 
exclusively from the federal courts.  They stem from having been able to 
watch clerks at work in a judge’s chambers, including their conferring 
with the judge about the next calendar’s cases; reading much 
communication between clerks and judge in the case files of a senior 
federal appellate judge, who granted access to those files; and a survey 
of the judge’s clerks on how they became clerks and, more directly 
relevant, the work they undertook for the judge.1 
A. Who Is a “Clerk”? 
When we talk of “law clerks,” of whom are we speaking?  We 
usually think of someone employed directly by a judge and serving that 
judge for a year, but many district judges have two-year clerkships, and 
an increasing number of appellate judges have at least one clerk who 
serves for two years to provide continuity.2  An increasing number of 
judges employ career clerks, or they may have one such clerk along with 
others rotating on a shorter-term basis.3  And we must not forget that 
not only law clerks but also a judge’s secretaries—sometimes with the 
newer title of judicial assistant (JA)—play a role in cases.4  A secretary, 
for example, may, in the judge’s absence, reply to procedural questions 
or requests for advice from other judges and, within chambers, may 
suggest options to her judge, both when requested and sua sponte.5 
 
1.  For material drawn from that survey, see generally Stephen L. Wasby, “Why Clerk? 
What Did I Get Out of It?,” 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 411 (2006), and Stephen L. Wasby, Clerking 
for an Appellate Judge: A Close Look, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 19 (2008) [hereinafter 
Wasby, Clerking]. 
2.  Judge Aldisert recently wrote that his sons had told him that, “although two-year 
clerkships made [his] work easier with a senior clerk always available to train the newcomer, 
it was not fair to the clerks” because of the student loan debt they had acquired.  Ruggero J. 
Aldisert, A Nonagenarian Discusses Life as a Senior Circuit Judge, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 183, 195 (2013). 
3.  Judge Posner asserts that “[e]xcept for very weak judges, having a career clerk is a 
mistake, as it tempts the judge to delegate excessively to that clerk.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, 
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 34 (2013).  For further discussion of delegation, see infra Part 
II.B. 
4.  See generally Stephen L. Wasby, A Judicial Secretary’s Many Roles: Working with an 
Appellate Judge and Clerks, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 151, 155–66 (2005). 
5.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Adell Johnson to Judge J. Clifford Wallace, 9th Cir. 
(Aug. 28, 1987) (referencing R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407 
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B. Staff Attorneys  
To obtain a (more) complete picture of utilization of clerks, we need 
to look not only at judges’ elbow clerks but also at staff attorneys who 
work for the court, usually for the Clerk of Court.  Not only do staff 
attorneys evaluate cases for their “weight” so that argument calendars 
can be properly constructed or the cases can be directed to screening 
panels, but they also identify issues that might be the basis for grouping 
cases on an argument panel.  More relevant here, they play a key role in 
the disposition of many of the very large proportion of cases decided 
with non-precedential rulings, whatever the name given those rulings in 
a particular court.6  Indeed, for cases decided by screening panels, the 
staff attorneys are the clerks who work with the judges, whose elbow 
clerks often do not see those cases.  While the judges on a screening 
panel make the determination of whether to retain a case on a screening 
panel calendar or to “kick” it to an argument/merits panel—and any 
one member of a screening panel can do that—the staff attorneys will 
usually have prepared a proposed memorandum disposition in lieu of a 
bench memo, and the judges most often accept that disposition as their 
own. 
If the complement of staff attorneys is large, the court may have 
subject-matter specialization; for example, the Second Circuit has both 
habeas attorneys and immigration attorneys.  By contrast, elbow clerks 
are generally expected to be generalists, dealing with all types of cases 
that come to the general jurisdiction federal courts, although, in 
chambers with multiple clerks, each set of clerks may be able to develop 
a specialty or to indulge preferences. 
The distinction between staff attorneys and law clerks, with the 
latter serving an individual judge for one or two years and the staff 
attorneys having longer tenure, is a useful one, but the distinction may 
tend to blur.  For one thing, judges’ use of career clerks means that 
length of service alone would not distinguish them from staff attorneys.  
 
(9th Cir. 1987), aff’d en banc, 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989)); Memorandum from Judge 
Herbert Choy, 9th Cir., to Adell Johnson (Jan. 4, 1988) (same); Memorandum from Adell 
Johnson to Judge Alfred T. Goodwin [hereinafter ATG], 9th Cir. (Jan. 25 1988) (same). 
6.  It is important to keep in mind the observation by Judge Diane Sykes (7th Cir.) that 
an important distinction between the U.S. Supreme Court on the one hand and state high 
courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals on the other is that in the latter, it is staff attorneys 
who select cases, whereas in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justices do so—of course aided by 
memoranda from the law clerks while they serve in the “cert pool.”  Panel Discussion, Judges’ 
Perspectives on Law Clerk Hiring, Utilization, and Influence, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 450 
(2014). 
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In addition, from time to time, staff attorneys serve as de facto elbow 
clerks.  They may be borrowed by judges for one or more cases, or they 
may move to a judge’s chambers for a period of time to experience 
working directly for a judge.  In addition, when a motions panel—for 
whom staff attorneys do the work—is faced with a large case that 
requires extensive treatment, for example, when a preliminary 
injunction is sought against a new municipal ordinance, a staff attorney 
may well perform the same tasks for the judges on the panel that in-
chambers clerks would usually perform. 
II. LAW CLERKS’ TASKS 
What tasks do law clerks perform?  Those who clerked for Justice 
Alfred T. Goodwin7 on the Oregon Supreme Court in the 1960s agreed 
that their tasks were principally to review the briefs, to verify citations 
or references to the record or to determine that the authorities cited 
were accurately stated, and at times to read the transcript, with “cite-
checking . . . a big part of the job.”8  Sometimes the research would 
extend to seeking out other authorities, and there might be “additional 
legal research on trouble issues.”  As one clerk said of the judge, “He 
told me what to research and I did it,” and another observed that the 
justice “delegated a fair amount of research and brief reviewing.”  The 
clerks would convey their conclusions and any suggestions through 
written memos, or they might (also) discuss with the judge what they 
had discovered.  While judges regularly use clerks to do research, they 
may differ in the purpose of that research.  One of Judge Goodwin’s 
later Ninth Circuit clerks has said that the judge used clerks for research 
to help him determine if he was right, whereas other judges, less familiar 
with many areas of the law, deployed their clerks to educate them about 
the law.  In the course of responding to documents as a case is 
processed, law clerks may also seek information for themselves.  Thus, 
in writing to his judge about how the judges should respond to a petition 
 
7.  After four years at a Eugene, Oregon, law firm, Judge Goodwin began his career on 
the bench with an appointment to the Circuit Court for Lane County.  In 1960, he was 
appointed to the Oregon Supreme Court.  After nine years on the Oregon Supreme Court, 
President Nixon appointed Judge Goodwin to the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon, where he served until his appointment in 1971 to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Serving as Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit from 1988 to 
1991, Judge Goodwin has continued to hear cases since assuming senior status in 1991.  See 
Stephen L. Wasby, Alfred T. Goodwin: A Special Judicial Career, 15 W. LEGAL HIST. 9 
(2002). 
8.  Unattributed quotations are taken from interviews of Judge Alfred T. Goodwin’s law 
clerks, undertaken on the condition of anonymity of the interview responses. 
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for rehearing en banc to suggest that the panel seek a response to the 
petition, the clerk indicated such a response would benefit not only the 
panel but himself:  
On December 7, we received a petition for rehearing and a 
petition for rehearing en banc. . . .  The most important point 
made by appellees in their petition concerns a case that was filed 
by this court on October 21, 2010, Ahcom, LTD v. Smelding, 
2010 WL 4117736 (9th Cir. 2010).  In light of that new holding, I 
believe the panel would benefit from, and certainly I would 
benefit from, a response to the en banc petition from the 
prevailing party.9 
Judge Goodwin wrote his own opinions—in earlier years, at a stand-
up desk—so opinion-drafting was not a major role for his clerks.10  As a 
clerk observed, “By and large he was the sole author.”  Although on 
occasion a clerk might be asked to draft portions of an opinion, a 
request to review and critique the judge’s draft opinion was more likely.  
The judge would do the first draft and then ask for a cite check, at which 
point the clerks would return with comments as well.  To the extent 
clerks’ input on proposed opinions was needed, the judge would be 
reliant on them, but not in the sense in which judges are criticized for 
letting too much flow into clerks’ hands.  As put by a former clerk of 
Judge Richard Posner, who writes his own opinions, “[H]e wanted 
someone to be his critic—to match wits with him intellectually, to fight 
with him and tell him why he was wrong.”11 
Judges who seek their clerks’ reactions to proposed opinions 
appreciate the comments they receive.  An indication of Judge 
Goodwin’s appreciation of his clerks’ contributions came when he was 
sitting in the south Pacific and did not have their assistance.  He told a 
court attorney in the Federated States of Micronesia, “I certainly don’t 
mind editorial help on my opinions.  I depend on my law clerks to help 
with that sort of thing at home, and when on the road, I miss my clerks 
 
9.  Memorandum from Timothy Ream, Law Clerk, to ATG (Dec. 8, 2010) (referencing 
Schwarzkopf v. Briones, 626 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
10.  See the link Judge Posner draws between a judge writing his or her own opinions 
and the basis for selecting clerks: “The judge who writes his own opinions will place less, and 
maybe no, emphasis on writing skills in selecting law clerks, and more emphasis on 
knowledge, intelligence, and research skills.”  POSNER, supra note 3, at 33. 
11.  Jeff Sommer, Defending the Open Internet, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, at BU1 
(quoting Tim Wu) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 116 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:111 
and their valuable suggestions, as well as their research.”12  In the same 
vein, a current state supreme court justice has observed that “[t]he 
product is not as good when there’s only one person involved,” rather 
than involving the clerks in producing the result.13 
Because Judge Goodwin was “such a good writer,” clerks’ language  
did not often appear in his opinions, although a few of their phrases 
might be included.  Instead, their suggestions were sometimes included 
in opinions “in nuances,” or some authority or line of reasoning they 
had found that was not in the briefs “would find its way in.”  Looking 
back, Justice Goodwin has recently observed about his Oregon Supreme 
Court cases, “I was a better writer before I began to rely so much on law 
clerks,”14 and he also stated that in due course on the court of appeals, 
his opinions became what he has called “recycled bench memos.”  Part 
of his better writing on the Oregon Supreme Court may have been that 
he did not have several law clerks, as U.S. Court of Appeals judges now 
have; state supreme court judges continue to have fewer clerks, which 
leads them to place less reliance on their clerks and perhaps also to 
write fewer separate opinions.15 
Judge Goodwin’s observation fits with comments by Judge Richard 
Posner that opinions now are more legalistic because they are more 
likely to be written by law clerks than was the case earlier.16  Law clerk-
written opinions may be more formulaic and judge-written opinions may 
be more individualized, but Albert Yoon shows that over time, the 
opinions of judges known to write their own are more stylistically 
consistent, while the style of opinions signed by other judges who rely 
more heavily on clerks for opinion-drafting can vary substantially from 
one year to the next.17  Reinforcing that finding, another judge said that 
if a judge’s style changes from year to year, it shows that the clerks write 
 
12.  Memorandum from ATG to Clark Reffner (May 16, 2007) (referencing Wainit v. 
Federated States of Micronesia, Appeal No. C2-2006). 
13.  Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 454 (comment by Justice David Stras). 
14.  Email from ATG to author (April 29, 2011, 6:20 PM EDT). 
15.  The writing of few separate opinions was suggested by Justice David Stras of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.  David R. Stras, Secret Agents: Using Law Clerks Effectively, 98 
MARQ. L. REV. 151, 172, 175–76 (2014). 
16.  “[T]oday most judicial opinions are written by law clerks, which was not true a 
century ago, when very few judges even had law clerks . . . and was less true decades ago, 
when judges had fewer law clerks and law still had a writing culture.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, 
HOW JUDGES THINK 221 (2008). 
17.  See Albert Yoon, Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary, 
98 MARQ. L. REV. 131, 142–43 (2014). 
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the opinions; he further observed that at the end of their year, clerks 
tend to write more like “their” judge.18 
In addition to drafting opinions or commenting on what their judge 
has drafted, law clerks play an important role in commenting on 
opinions coming from other judges.  Indeed, at times the monitoring 
clerk for a case sees and comments on an incoming opinion from 
another judge on the panel before the clerk’s own judge sees it, so that 
the judge reads that opinion with the clerk’s views in hand.  The clerk 
can affect those incoming opinions when the clerk prepares a comment 
memorandum on one, the clerk’s judge then sends it to the writing judge 
with minimal changes, and the law clerk’s proposed edits to the opinion 
are adopted by the writing judge.19  Thus, when judges note editorial 
changes to be considered by the writer of an opinion, the clerk is likely 
to have initiated the content of such a message, in addition to the “nit 
memos” (lists of technical and style changes) prepared by clerks to be 
sent to the author, either under the judge’s name or through the judge 
but clearly indicated as having been prepared by a clerk. 
Judges may also specifically ask for reactions to particular arriving 
opinions20 or may also task the clerk to watch for the presence of 
particular matters in the opinions of certain other judges.  For example, 
Judge Goodwin would instruct his clerks to read with particular care the 
opinions of judges thought to have agendas to be sure that those judges 
did not insert dicta in those opinions for use in later cases.  This is part 
of the internal monitoring that takes place as a result of other clerks and 
judges looking at the same matters.21 
A. Bench Memos 
One of clerks’ tasks is the preparation of bench memoranda for each 
case.  Most often, these are written only for the clerk’s judge, although 
the judge might then share them with other members of the court.  
Clerk preparation of bench memos, part of clerks’ involvement in the 
 
18.  Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 454 (comment by Judge James A. Wynn, Jr. (4th 
Cir.)). 
19.  See, for example, the exchanges with regard to Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 655 F.3d 
1066 (9th Cir. 2011), amended by, 660 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 2011). 
20.  See, e.g., Note on Face of Another Judge’s Proposed Opinion from ATG to Barbara 
Reeves, Law Clerk (referencing United States v. Systron-Donner Corp., 486 F.2d 249 (9th 
Cir. 1973)) (“I need the advice of at least one law clerk on this.  It may turn into a lot of 
work.”). 
21.  Carolyn Shapiro, Comment at Marquette University Law School Conference, 
Judicial Assistants or Junior Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and Influence of Law Clerks. 
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early stages of considering cases, is quite important because through 
them the clerks may help frame the issues the judges consider or on 
which they focus.  Based on the briefs, a clerk’s memo to the judge 
might identify issues to which attention should be paid, that is, which 
issues are particularly important, and clerks may introduce issues 
beyond those raised in the briefs.  As part of the bench memo (or 
separately), the clerk may also pose questions to be asked of counsel at 
argument; if those questions are used, the clerk has helped affect the 
content and tone of argument.  Clerks’ contributions through their 
bench memos are likely to be greater in more complex cases because, 
although the judge may devote more time to the more complex cases, 
the clerk has more time than the judge to devote to the case, giving the 
clerk an “information advantage.”  However, the judge’s greater 
experience provides heuristics used to cut through many cases.22 
When a court, like the Ninth Circuit, uses shared bench memos,23 the 
clerk in one chambers helps set the tone not only for the writing clerk’s 
judge but for all three members of the panel.  That tone includes both 
the issues on which the case is to focus and it may also include the 
disposition the writer of the memorandum recommends.24  Of course, 
the other judges may disagree, or their clerks might disagree with the 
bench memo and prepare response memos.  Ninth Circuit bench memos 
are most often circulated unreviewed by the judge, so the judge is not 
committed to the law clerk’s recommendations, and those 
recommendations are not always followed even by the clerk’s own 
judge.  While some judges note their general agreement with the 
memo’s recommendations, others may distance themselves from the 
recommendation (“I do not necessarily agree . . . .”) and may even state 
disagreement with it.25  So judges clearly do not feel held to the position 
proposed by their own clerks, although there may be some pull in that 
direction, especially when the judge does not especially familiarize 
himself with the case. 
When response memos are prepared, at times they are then shared 
with the other panel members, and a sort of dialogue among the 
 
22.  Wasby, Clerking, supra note 1, at 91. 
23.  Only a few U.S. Courts of Appeals use shared bench memos, and several Ninth 
Circuit judges opt out. 
24.  Stras, supra note 15, at 177; Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 450 (comment by 
Judge Diane Sykes). 
25. “For the first time in several years, my clerk is more willing to affirm than I am.”  
Memorandum from ATG to Panel (May 29, 1975) (accompanying bench memo in United 
States v. Evans, 519 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
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clerks—while most often formally through the judges—takes place.  
Thus, in one immigration appeal, there was an initial bench memo 
prepared by an extern to a district judge sitting by designation on a 
panel, a response memo from the clerk of one of the other panel 
members, and a further response from the writer of the first memo in 
which positions initially taken were altered.26  Despite the use of 
response memos, in busy chambers the path of least resistance may be 
to accept the bench memo’s arguments unless they are thought quite out 
of line.  Thus, the bench memo becomes the default agenda-setting 
device. 
Shared bench memos affect the style of opinions.  If the bench 
memo is prepared by Judge X’s chambers, two things are likely to result: 
(1) Judge X is likely to receive the writing assignment for the panel 
unless Judge X were to dissent, and (2) the draft opinion will be based 
on the bench memo.  The latter can result in treatment of some issues 
more extensively than is necessary unless the judge intervenes to strike 
some of the material.  There is also the risk that in transforming the 
bench memo into an opinion, the law clerk will adhere more closely to 
the original bench memo language than to the direction laid out in the 
post-argument conference memorandum from the panel’s presiding 
judge (indicating the judges’ positions, the result, and the writing 
assignment).  For example, in a case in which the bench memo had 
recommended reversal, at conference the panel decided to affirm.  
When a proposed opinion was circulated, another member of the panel 
pointed to the conference memo for his understanding of the panel’s 
position and commented, “Rather than take this route, the opinion 
reverts to the bench memorandum’s approach, analyzing the entire 
NWA under an ‘intermediate scrutiny’ standard.”27  The extent to which 
a bench memo can guide judges’ actions is seen in conference memos 
indicating that the judges “agreed with the bench memo” or decided to 
affirm “for the reasons set forth in the bench memo”;28 this is a further 
indication that clerks frame matters. 
While clerks’ bench memos play an important role in the outcome of 
a case, and particularly in what a disposition (opinion or memorandum) 
says, at times, and usually in simpler cases, instead of a bench memo the 
 
26.  See the exchange of communication with regard to Garcia Tellez v. Holder, 07-
72366, 451 F. App’x 655 (9th Cir. 2011). 
27.  Memorandum from Judge J. Clifford Wallace, 9th Cir., to Panel (Aug. 4, 2004) 
(referencing Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
28.  Wasby, Clerking, supra note 1, at 58. 
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clerks prepare a proposed, non-precedential memorandum disposition 
which also performs the bench memo function.  In that situation, it is 
clear the clerk is writing the court’s disposition. 
B. Delegation 
In considering the tasks law clerks perform, judges’ delegation of 
those tasks—a critic might say abdication of responsibility for judicial 
duties—to clerks is quite important.  Over time and particularly during 
his long service in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Goodwin came to delegate 
much to his clerks.  While some view judges’ delegation to law clerks 
negatively, such delegation, particularly if accompanied by guidance, 
can be functional in harnessing the strengths of staff so that they can 
contribute to the judge’s work rather than having the judge involved in 
minutiae.29  And, as a clerk has suggested, the judge can determine both 
generally and for each case the role the judge wishes the clerk to play.  
In particular, a judge would be sure to use a clerk’s special strengths—
strengths for which the judge might have hired the clerk.  For example, a 
judge might make sure to have a law clerk with experience clerking for a 
district judge so that the clerk knows how to read a record in order to be 
able to turn to that clerk for that purpose. 
In any event, a judge’s delegation of tasks to clerks is unavoidable, 
and a judge has said about having clerks draft opinions that one can’t 
put that “genie . . . back in the bottle” given the caseload facing the 
courts—the U.S. Courts of Appeals in particular.30  That delegation is 
unavoidable and that it has increased over time does not, however, 
mean that it takes place across the board.  Instead, it may take place 
more with some types of cases than with others.  For example, there 
may be some subject-areas in which a judge is less interested or less 
well-informed and thus will leave more to the clerk than in areas of 
great interest to the judge or ones with which the judge is familiar.31  
More generally, as the late Ninth Circuit Judge Joseph Sneed observed, 
less complex cases “easily can be assigned to clerks without elaborate 
instructions” while the judge devotes more attention to more complex 
 
29.  See id. at 82–83. 
30.  Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 453 (comment by Judge Diane Sykes).  Could it 
be that the “non-delegation doctrine,” generally dead in administrative law, is also dead in 
judicial chambers?  And for similar reasons, that is, that there is so much work, the principal 
(the legislature or, here, the judge) cannot do it all and must have “helpers,” whether 
administrative agencies or law clerks?  This intriguing suggestion comes from Erin Kaheny. 
31.  Professor John Szmer, Comment at Marquette University Law School Conference, 
Judicial Assistants or Junior Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and Influence of Law Clerks. 
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ones, but “as the volume of ‘tough and complex’ cases grows, each of us 
feels compelled to assign initially to clerks what a few years ago we 
might have considered a case deserving initial, intense, and thorough 
consideration by the judge with some intensely guided assistance by the 
elbow clerk.”32 
In addition, the judge’s role conception—the expectations of how 
the judge should function in the judicial system and the judge’s view of 
his or her institutional role—will affect delegation to clerks and, more 
broadly, the ways in which the judge uses them.33  Thus, what is 
delegated—or what is considered appropriate to be delegated—varies 
by judge.  Some judges will consider a certain task non-delegable, while 
another judge might consider the same task one that could be given to a 
clerk.34  Stating matters this way suggests that delegation is done 
consciously by the judge; it may be unintended or a matter of slippage, 
particularly if a judge is aging or ill, which would serve to limit the 
judge’s supervision of clerks.35 
These comments about increased delegation bring us to the notion 
of trajectory.  Just as there is variation among judges in the extent to 
which they delegate work, particularly opinion-drafting, to clerks, there 
may also be variability in delegation over the course of any individual 
judge’s career.  Of course, if a judge—say a former law partner in a 
large firm, accustomed to supervising associates—engages in 
considerable delegation from the beginning, that practice or habit is 
unlikely to change.  However, particularly if the judge is young at time 
of appointment and thus not far distant in age from the clerks, a greater 
sharing of work may well result; the judge’s greater energy at a younger 
age may also lead the judge to undertake much of opinion-writing.  
There is likely to be increasing delegation as a judge ages and slows 
down, although increased delegation may also stem largely from 
increased caseload, particularly on mandatory jurisdiction courts like 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals or state intermediate appellate courts. 
 
32.  Law Clerk Hiring Problems: Are They Symptoms of “Case Overload” in the 
Circuits?, Memorandum from Judge Joseph Sneed, 9th Cir., to Associates (March 4, 2002). 
33.  See Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 444, 454–55. 
34.  See id. at 452–55. 
35.  For the suggestion that “[t]he weakened condition of Brennan and Marshall meant 
that their clerks weren’t as well supervised as in previous years,” see JAN CRAWFORD 
GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDER STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 77 (2007). 
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III. INFLUENCE AND RELIANCE 
A. Influence   
At the core of questions about judges’ law clerks is their influence.  
The existence and extent of clerk influence may depend on 
perspective—whether that of the judge or the clerk.  Illustrative are 
messages on a collective clerks’ Christmas card to Judge Goodwin.  One 
clerk wrote, “Judge, You’re like Santa. We’re like Santa’s elves,” but 
another inserted a footnote which read “In other words, you get all the 
credit and we do all the work.”36  Clerks may both overstate their own 
influence because they are too full of themselves or lack perspective and 
understate that influence out of humility or because they do not 
understand their real effect.37 
At an extreme, clerks are said to make basic determinations and to 
write the key language in opinions.  Short of that, there are instances in 
which a clerk’s action does affect the outcome.  A Ninth Circuit case 
provides an example.38  After there had been considerable back-and-
forth within a panel over a case, a clerk discovered a procedural 
problem, leading to disposition of the case on the basis of that matter.  
A member of the panel was preparing to dissent; the majority opinion’s 
author made changes to his opinion; changes were made to the dissent; 
then there were further changes to the majority opinion—when the 
clerk’s discovery ended matters.  The author wrote to his panel 
colleagues to say that he had been working further on the opinion. 
Meanwhile, one of my law clerks matched up the two notices of 
appeal with the various papers appealed from and discovered 
that there was no judgment on a separate document as required 
by Fed.R.Civ.P.58 and our recent cases following Indrelunas (411 
U.S. 216 (1983)). 
Rather than invest the considerable additional time that 
would be necessary to satisfy my now ravenous curiosity about 
the substantive questions lurking in this case, it occurred to me 
that a better case might come along later . . . and that if we 
dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, as I believe we must, 
we might be doing everyone a favor. 
 
36.  Christmas card in files of Judge Alfred T. Goodwin. 
37.  Suggested by Tony Mauro, Comments at Marquette University Law School 
Conference, Judicial Assistants or Junior Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and Influence of 
Law Clerks. 
38.  Housley v. United States, 35 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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And indeed the appeal was dismissed.  Thus, in that case, the writing 
judge explicitly acknowledged the clerk’s contribution to it, as he also 
did in writing to colleagues that “[a]t conference, we decided to affirm 
. . . on the grounds that all claims were time-barred. . . .  My law clerk 
has since persuaded me that Housley’s Bivens claims are not time-
barred.”39  There are other times in which the acknowledgment that the 
judge has moved toward a clerk’s position is more oblique, as when a 
judge, “[a]fter considerable internal conflict and a close review of the 
record,” could not join a disposition.40 
What do we mean by influence?  The toughest test is that Person A 
exerts influence over another (B) only when A is able to get B to do 
what B would not otherwise have done.  One does find instances in 
which a judge, having decided to vote a certain way in a case, is 
persuaded by a law clerk to change positions.  However, those instances 
are rare.  Judge Goodwin talks of “one case each year” when a clerk’s 
view prevails over his—when the clerk presses the judge to adopt a 
position different from the one to which he was initially inclined.41  And 
it would appear that the judge may be open to allowing that to happen, 
in one case a year, but that shows even further that the judge is in 
control.  Perhaps more often, the judge, not being sure how to decide, 
asks the law clerk which way to move from dead center; in such 
situations, the law clerk’s influence, if used cautiously, can be 
determinative.  Thus, in a drug case involving a car search that led to a 
house search, Judge Goodwin wrote to his clerk, “I’m at a crossroad 
here” as to whether to hold the car search bad and apply the “fruit of 
the poisonous tree” doctrine or to say the car search was good and 
probable cause to arrest thus existed.42  
While there are instances in which the clerk’s view prevails, there 
are many more instances in which the “recommendation is left in the 
dust”;43 after all, the judge is the boss and is fully capable of saying “no” 
even if saying it more diplomatically.  This is part of the larger matter 
that a law clerk’s submitting work to a judge doesn’t mean the judge will 
use it.  And it must also be remembered that to talk about law clerk’s 
influence is to assume that law clerks have positions and have 
 
39.  Memorandum from ATG to Panel (n.d.) (referencing Housley, 35 F.3d 400). 
40.  Memorandum from ATG to Panel (June, 18 1996) (referencing Campbell v. Chater, 
94 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Wasby, Clerking, supra note 1, at 90. 
41.  Wasby, Clerking, supra note 1, at 90. 
42.  Memorandum from ATG to David Kaye (referencing United States v. Connolly, 
479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
43.  Wasby, Clerking, supra note 1, at 58. 
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recommended their adoption.  While certainly some law clerks are quite 
brash and too certain of their views, more generally law clerks tend to 
be too deferential.44  Particularly early in their tenure, they may be 
reticent to make recommendations, although they become less so 
toward the end of their clerkship.  Indeed, it has been suggested that law 
clerks are less valuable to a judge in the early months of a clerkship.45  
They may not come forth with recommendations even when instructed 
by their judge to do so.46  Or they may be unable to arrive at a 
recommendation, as we see when one law clerk admitted to vacillating, 
writing of the clerk’s shift between alternative positions several times, at 
which point he “decided to pass the buck to you” while offering 
opinions on both sides of the issue.47  It would be interesting to see if 
clerks who have worked for a few years before their clerkship—an 
increasing phenomenon, at least at the U.S. Supreme Court48—are more 
sure of themselves and thus more likely to make recommendations than 
those who clerk under the older “standard model” in which a clerkship 
directly follows law school.  The effects might be similar if someone had 
served in multiple clerkships, as when someone takes a clerkship on a 
U.S. court of appeals after clerking in a state appellate court or a U.S. 
district court.  
However, if clerks seldom “turn the judge around,” are clerks 
without influence when they don’t write opinions?  The most basic 
aspect of a clerk’s “influence” —better, the clerk’s effect—is that all 
information provided to the judge is important, and the clerk is having 
an effect through providing that information, if only by undertaking 
research assigned by the judge (and not slanting it toward a particular 
result).49  And it has already been noted that a bench memo, whether 
sent to the entire panel or written only for the clerk’s judge, serves to 
frame issues in a case, certainly an important effect.  And it has also 
been noted that a law clerk’s comments on another panel member’s 
 
44.  Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 451 (comment by Judge James A. Wynn, Jr. (4th 
Cir.)). 
45.  Joseph D. Kearney, A Truth About Career Law Clerks, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 13, 15 
(2014). 
46.  Wasby, Clerking, supra note 1, at 57. 
47.  Memorandum from Susan Leeson to ATG (May 24, 1975) (referencing Hunt-
Wesson Foods v. Gross, 73-2769 (case settled, no citation)). 
48.  See David Lat, Comments at Marquette University Law School Conference, Judicial 
Assistants or Junior Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and Influence of Law Clerks. 
49.  For a discussion of the information effect of clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court, see 
Zachary Wallander & Sara C. Benesh, Law Clerks as Advisors: A Look at the Blackmun 
Papers, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2014). 
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opinion may have an effect.  When a law clerk is charged with drafting 
an opinion on the basis of the judge’s known position and instructions, 
the clerk doesn’t determine the result but may be able to persuade the 
judge to adopt a certain way of reaching the judge’s preferred 
outcome,50 and this is particularly important in precedential opinions.  
There may be a considerable possibility of a clerk affecting the 
judge’s opinion if the clerk is willing to criticize what the judge has 
written—and if the judge is open to such criticism.  As to Judge 
Goodwin’s proposed opinion in a search case, where the law clerk 
disagreed with the result, he wrote to the judge that he found the 
opinion’s “parade of horribles . . . somewhat disingenuous.”51  Criticism 
could also be stronger and more persistent, as we see when a law clerk 
working on a tax case wrote several polite but direct memos to the judge 
about what was wrong with the opinion, in one invoking the agreement 
of his fellow clerk.52  Thus, even if one can seldom say that a judge 
would or would not have done something “but for” a clerk’s action, we 
can speak of clerks having an identifiable role in the judge’s work—and 
that satisfies at least a minimal meaning of influence. 
The focus of this Article is on clerks in the federal appellate courts, 
but the question of clerk influence also exists in state appellate courts.  
In one study, state supreme court justices were asked about clerks’ role 
in the decision-making process, the judges’ agreement with the clerks’ 
recommendations, and the proportion of cases in which the judges 
changed opinions as a result of law clerk advice.53  Generally, the judges 
spoke of making use of law clerks, but there was no suggestion that the 
clerks played a major role in the court’s decisions.54  The judges were 
much more likely to use their clerks for research than for 
recommendations.55  Some did find law clerk recommendations highly 
influential but within the context that a clerk typically agreed with the 
 
50.  Wasby, Clerking, supra note 1, at 92. 
51.  Memorandum from Law Clerk (Don) to ATG (Jan. 16, 1974) (referencing United 
States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
52.  Memorandum from Charles Adams to ATG (Dec. 19, 1975) (referencing Thatcher 
v. Comm’r, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976)) (“Wayne and I both have misgivings about the 
result . . . .”); see also Memorandum from Charles Adams to ATG (Jan. 21, 1976); 
Memorandum from Charles Adams to ATG (n.d.); Memorandum from Charles Adams to 
ATG (Feb. 19, 1976). 
53.  See Rick A. Swanson & Stephen L. Wasby, Good Stewards: Law Clerk Influence in 
State High Courts, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 24, 29 (2008). 
54.  Id. at 31–32. 
55.  Id. at 32. 
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judge’s inclinations.56  Judges’ dominance in the process is seen more 
clearly when they were asked the percent of cases in which clerks’ 
recommendations changed an opinion: the mean and median responses 
were less than ten percent.57  Thus, the authors concluded that clerk 
research, rather than recommendations, affects the judges.58  However, 
reinforcing what was noted earlier as to bench memoranda, there was a 
greater clerk effect if the clerk worked on the case first rather than after 
the judge had begun work on it.59  And the judges certainly were clear 
that they were in charge.60  In considering these findings, it must be kept 
in mind that when, as here, the judges were being asked for their views, 
they might well be inclined to minimize law clerk influence. 
B. Reliance 
An aspect of law clerk influence on judges is the judges’ reliance on 
the clerks.  If a law clerk and a judge work together, or at least in 
parallel, on a case, the law clerk may have a slight, but not great, 
informational advantage concerning the case, and in that situation, the 
judge and clerk can engage each other’s views.  If, however, a judge lets 
the law clerk carry the burden of work on a case, the law clerk’s 
information advantage may be substantial, thus increasing the possibility 
of that clerk’s influence over the judge in decisions related to the case.  
Judges vary in the extent of their reliance on clerks, with some 
seemingly unable to function in the short run if the clerk associated with 
a case is absent.  
As a general matter, when consideration of a case in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals continues into the early summer, one can find judges calling 
on each other to complete work on it before the law clerks working on 
the case leave.  For example, in sending an opinion for consideration, a 
judge acknowledged that law clerks might be changing: “I realize that 
law clerks come and go and this may be dropping on your desk during a 
period of transition.” 61  He therefore asked that if his panel colleagues 
had major problems with this opinion, he “would appreciate an early 
warning,” indicating that he wished his current clerk to be able to finish 
work on the case: “I would like to get as much help as possible from my 
 
56.  Id. at 35–36. 
57.  Id. at 41 & 42 tbl.5. 
58.  Id. at 44–45. 
59.  Id. at 34. 
60.  Id. at 40. 
61.  Memorandum from ATG to Panel (June 7, 1993) (referencing United States ex rel. 
Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
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current law clerk who has spent about six months on this case before she 
goes off to billable time.”62 
In a different case, a judge wrote to his colleagues, “We are at the 
cusp of a law-clerk year and if we get into an intra-panel dispute, which 
no doubt would invite en banc traffic, we would have new law clerks 
working on material that our chambers have already spent a substantial 
amount of time in considering,” and more delay would be created.63  
And in still another case, the judge wrote to his panel colleagues, 
“Please, if you can while your incumbent law clerks are still around, give 
me a decisive vote on what each of you think we should do about 
jurisdiction,” and a fellow panel member wrote shortly thereafter, “It 
would be helpful to me if we could conclude this matter before the 
present law clerks leave.”64  Of course, comments like this may only 
reflect a concern that if the case “goes over,” a new clerk will have a 
steep learning curve in an ongoing matter, but more seems to be 
involved. 
When a judge—perhaps a moderate or less explicitly ideological 
judge—is not firmly committed to a position in a case and is also highly 
reliant on clerks and the case carries over from one set of clerks to the 
next set, the judge may be more likely to shift position on the basis of 
the recommendations made by the new clerk.  On the other hand, a 
judge with a firm ideological stance is likely to be more impervious to 
shifts in the positions taken by clerks who work on a case over time. 
Judges’ reliance on clerks is also thought to affect a panel’s 
willingness to take a case back after a district court decision on remand 
from the panel.  When a court of appeals panel has remanded a case for 
further action in the district court, the case may return after the passage 
of considerable time, with all panel members now having new clerks.  
When the panel is asked by the Clerk’s office whether it wishes to take 
the “comeback” case, the judges of the panel often vote to reject the 
case, sending it to another panel.  However, at least one judge has 
argued that the actions of the district judge on remand may have 
resulted from the panel’s disposition and thus the panel should take the 
case back to “clean up its own mess.”65  When that judge volunteers to 
 
62.  Id. 
63.  Memorandum from ATG to Panel (Aug. 14 1997) (referencing United States v. 
Doe, 122 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision)). 
64.  Memorandum from ATG to Panel (July 7, 2005) (referencing Santos v. Guam, 436 
F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2006)); Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace, Judge, 9th Cir., to Panel 
(July 13, 2005) (same). 
65.  From various instances in cases in which Judge Alfred T. Goodwin participated. 
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write for the panel should it take the comeback case, his colleagues are 
often willing to accept the case when they would not otherwise have 
been willing. 
C. Recommendations, Ideology, and Selection   
The extent to which judges accepted clerks’ recommendations and 
relied on clerks may be related to ideology, particularly in types of cases 
in which the underlying statutory or constitutional language to be 
interpreted is vague and the subject is controversial—think immigration 
or search and seizure.  The “ideological distance” between clerk and 
judge may condition the clerk’s effect.  If clerk and judge share the same 
basic outlook, they would likely come out at the same place even 
without use of words like “recommendation.”  And situations of 
minimal ideological distance occur when judges select their clerks for 
ideological compatibility or prospective law clerks apply for clerkships 
based on the judges’ ideology, something thought to be the case for 
those with Federalist Society memberships and for those with 
comparable liberal affinities.66  More generally, self-selection often 
brings clerks of a certain view to judges of similar views, at least as the 
prospective clerk perceives those views. 
However, at times there is not an ideological match.  In addition to 
speaking of wanting “new blood” and up-to-date legal learning in 
chambers, quite a number of judges select at least some of their clerks 
for views that differ from their own, as seen in the report by a clerk that 
her judge, thought to be moderate to conservative, told her, “You are 
my liberal clerk for this year.”  Such a statement does not mean that the 
clerk is there for window-dressing, as the judge may indeed wish to be 
challenged and thus be more, not less, likely to accept recommendations 
of a clerk who comes at problems from a perspective different from the 
judge’s. 
Perhaps more important, in choosing the judges to whom they will 
apply, not all prospective clerks select on the basis of ideology, or it may 
be but one of a number of factors.67  Indeed, law students seek 
clerkships for a variety of reasons.  One might be to participate in the 
development of the law, perhaps regardless of the direction it would 
take; this is related to wanting to understand better the process by which 
the judicial system operates, perhaps for use in the clerk’s later career, 
 
66.  See Swanson & Wasby, supra note 53, at 36. 
67.  This paragraph draws on Wasby, “Why Clerk? What Did I Get Out of It?,” supra 
note 1. 
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say as an appellate litigator, for the benefit of future clients.  A would-
be clerk may wish to hold a clerkship in a particular location and thus 
might not be selective as to which judge there would provide a 
satisfactory clerkship, perhaps even applying to all judges there 
regardless of their ideological orientation, just as it is now apparent that 
those seeking clerkships at the U.S. Supreme Court routinely apply to 
all the Justices.  Or the choice of a clerkship may depend on having a 
good working relationship that includes close interaction with the judge, 
as when it may be clear that to clerk for a particular judge is to be far 
more involved in working directly with the judge than in other 
chambers.  Think of the clerks of a particular judge who came to know a 
judge down the hall better than they knew their own judge, who 
imposed “distance” between judge and clerks.  A clerk who had held 
one clerkship, having liked that situation, might seek another.  
These various reasons are not merely of interest for their own sake.  
They may affect the role the clerk plays in a judge’s chambers, just as a 
judge’s role affects the use of law clerks, and they could well affect 
clerks’ recommendations and judges’ receptivity to them.  Thus, if 
someone applied for a particular clerkship because of agreement with 
the judge’s ideology, we might expect the clerk to make 
recommendations to the judge on cases because the clerk would know 
(or at least assume) that clerk and judge were on the same wavelength, 
and there would be little need for the clerk to press the judge—unless 
the clerk was more avid ideologically and wanted to carry the judge 
further.  However, someone who took a clerkship to learn about the 
process of the law might be less likely to press the judge for a particular 
result.  The same might be true of those who sought a clerkship as 
breathing space after law school while figuring out what to do next. 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Law clerks are, without question, an essential part of the judiciary.  
Without them, judges with heavy and increasing caseloads would be 
able to decide far fewer cases.  Judges need both their own elbow clerks 
and those who serve the court as a whole.  Once it is recognized that 
courts cannot function without clerks, one can debate such matters as 
the extent to which judges rely on them and whether the clerks have 
undue influence on “their” judges.  The same caseload considerations 
that make clerks necessary also make it likely that judges’ reliance on 
them will be more than minimal and that it will have increased over 
time.  The extent to which that reliance gives the clerks influence is 
determined by a number of factors, which have been discussed in this 
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Article.  However, ultimately the extent of reliance and influence is for 
the judge to decide, either consciously or implicitly by letting certain 
types of decisions slide to the clerks. 
